Why does later Wittgenstein think that there cannot be a language that only one person can speak - a language that is essentially private? Discuss

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INTRODUCTION

The question of whether a private language—a language that is, in principle, accessible and understandable to only one person—is possible has been a central debate in the philosophy of language and mind since Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein’s later work mounts a sustained and subtle attack on the very possibility of such a language, arguing that language is essentially a social, public phenomenon. According to Wittgenstein, a language that only one person could speak is not just impractical; it is conceptually incoherent, leading to profound implications for our understanding of meaning, thought, and even the nature of consciousness.

Summary Table: Public vs. Private Language According to Wittgenstein

BODY

Wittgenstein’s Project in the Philosophical Investigations

Wittgenstein’s philosophy underwent a dramatic shift from his early work (especially his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) to his later period. In his later writings, he rejects his earlier view that language primarily functions to represent states of affairs in the world. Instead, he emphasizes that meaning arises from use—that is, from the role words and sentences play in various contexts of human activity, or what he called “language-games”. This new approach fundamentally reshapes how we should think about language, meaning, and communication.

Within this project, Wittgenstein addresses the idea of a private language at the notorious sections §243–315 of the Philosophical Investigations. He defines a private language as one whose words refer “to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate, private sensations. So another cannot understand the language”. Importantly, this is not about a personal code or cipher, which could in principle be deciphered by others, but about a language essentially private—whose meaning is, by its nature, inaccessible to anyone else.

Wittgenstein’s Central Claim

According to Wittgenstein, such a necessarily private language cannot exist. His argument is not about the practical difficulty of keeping a secret diary, or the improbability of a language never being taught to another person. Rather, he gives reasons why the concept itself is logically incoherent.

Step-by-Step Reconstruction of the Private Language Argument

1. What Does a Private Language Look Like?

Wittgenstein invites us to imagine a person who tries to keep a diary about a recurring sensation—say, a peculiar kind of pain—by writing ‘S’ each time the pain occurs. The word ‘S’ is supposed to refer directly to this private sensation, and not to any outward behavior or physical manifestation. The user intends ‘S’ to mean “this sensation, as I identify it inwardly, irrespective of any public criteria.”

This scenario is not about solipsism or skepticism about other minds. Rather, it is about the very possibility of words referring to purely private experiences—meanings that are, by definition, not checkable or corrigible by anyone but the user.

2. The Problem of Establishing Meaning in a Private Language

For language to have meaning, it must be possible to distinguish between correct and incorrect uses of that language. However, Wittgenstein asks: How could the diary keeper ever establish that ‘S’ actually refers to the same sensation each time? There is, after all, no public criterion by which the correctness of the use of ‘S’ could be determined: no one else could verify or challenge the user’s application of ‘S’.

3. The Impossibility of Private Ostension

Ostension—pointing to something as a way of defining a word—is a standard way to fix reference in language. But in the case of a private sensation, one cannot point to it in public. All ostension would have to be private: pointing inwardly to the sensation itself. However, Wittgenstein argues, this is not a real possibility. “Inner pointing” doesn’t constitute a genuine definition because there is nothing to guarantee that the same sensation is being pointed at each time ‘S’ is used. The user cannot truly remember the original sensation independent of labels or context.

4. The Problem of Correctness

Moreover, even if the private linguist does “remember” the sensation, there is no criterion of correctness. The user could not distinguish between remembering the sensation correctly and merely seeming to remember it. Any claim to have got it right is vacuous, because there is no standard of rightness apart from the person’s own sense of what counts as correct.

5. No Possibility of Rule-Following

Language, for Wittgenstein, is a system of rules. For rules to exist, they must be capable of being applied, corrected, and practiced over time in ways that can be assessed by others. In a private language, there is no possibility of such correction or assessment. The user is always their own final arbiter, and thus, in effect, is not following a rule at all. Without the possibility of being wrong, there is no such thing as following a rule.

6. The Essentially Public Nature of Language

For Wittgenstein, then, language is not just de facto public, but essentially public. The meaning of words is constituted by their use in public language-games, and their correctness is determined by shared practices and criteria. In a truly private language, there is neither use nor criteria in this sense—just a kind of solipsistic naming that lacks the structure of genuine language.

Wittgenstein’s Wider Arguments Against Private Language

The Impossibility of Teaching or Learning a Private Language

A language that is necessarily private cannot be taught or learned by another person. Wittgenstein’s emphasis is not just on the absence of teaching, but on the conceptual incoherence of teaching such a language. If meaning is fixed by private ostension, there is nothing for a learner to latch on to—no “public handle” by which meaning can be checked.

The Lack of Criteria for Correction

Wittgenstein notes that we can correct and refine our language use because others can challenge us. In the diary example, however, no such correction is possible. The user cannot even confirm for themselves that ‘S’ is used correctly, since there is no independent standard to appeal to.

The Danger of Subjectivism and Cartesian Privacy

Wittgenstein’s argument aims to undercut the Cartesian picture of the mind, according to which each person has privileged, incorrigible access to their own mental states, and the meanings of their words are fixed by these inner experiences. If such a picture were correct, then our language about sensations would indeed be a private language—but Wittgenstein argues that this very picture is incoherent, because it severs the connection between language and its public criteria of use.

Major Interpretations and Scholarly Debates

The Role of Skepticism About Memory

Some interpreters see Wittgenstein’s argument as rooted in skepticism about memory: How can we be sure that the memory of a private sensation is accurate, if the only “check” available is the memory itself? If everything is up for grabs, then nothing is fixed—including the meaning of words in the private language.

Criticisms and Responses

A major objection, raised by philosophers such as John Searle and Saul Kripke, is that Wittgenstein’s argument may prove too much: if private language is impossible, does this mean that all our talk about “private” experiences and sensations is meaningless? Wittgenstein’s response, clarified by commentators, is nuanced: he does not deny that we have private experiences or sensations. Rather, he denies that we can refer to them directly in a language that is essentially private—that is, a language whose meanings are fixed by wholly private criteria and unavailable to others.

The Social Nature of Language and the ‘Language-Game’

Wittgenstein emphasizes that language is not a static entity but a dynamic, rule-governed activity—a “game” played in social contexts. The idea of a private language fails because it lacks the social practice that gives rules their life and meaning. Meaning is not a private, mental act, but a public, shared activity.

Ordinary Language vs. Private Language

Wittgenstein distinguishes sharply between ordinary language—public, shared, and corrigible—and private language—idiosyncratic, non-shareable, and uncorrectable. Ordinary language is the only language we have, according to Wittgenstein. The very possibility of meaning, rule-following, and communication depends on its social structure.

Wittgenstein’s Broader Implications

The Demise of the ‘Name-theory’ of Meaning

Wittgenstein’s attack on private language is, at the same time, an attack on the “name-theory” of meaning, according to which words function by “naming” objects, ideas, or sensations in the mind. This theory, found in thinkers from Locke to early Russell, is shown to be inadequate by Wittgenstein’s argument. For meaning is not merely a matter of attaching names to private mental items, but of the public use of words in shared practices.

The Status of First-Person Experience

Wittgenstein does not deny that people have sensations or private experiences. What he denies is that such experiences can serve as the semantic anchor for language. Their existence is not in doubt, but their expressibility—and hence their role in constituting meaning—is severely limited.

The Publicity of the Mental

Wittgenstein’s view implies a radical shift from a “private mind” to a “public mind.” Mental states and sensations are not hidden away in a private Cartesian theatre, but are expressed in and through our public language and behavior. The “inner” is not isolated from the “outer”; rather, our talk about the inner is made possible by the public criteria of the outer.

Critiques and Extensions

Criticism from Direct Introspection

One might argue that introspection is sufficient to fix the meaning of private terms. If I know directly what I mean by ‘S,’ why isn’t that enough? Wittgenstein’s response is that meaning is not a private mental event but a social practice of rule-following. Introspection cannot provide the normative element essential to meaning—the difference between being correct and merely seeming correct.

Scientific Objectivity and Private Language

Some have argued that scientific standards could, in principle, provide criteria for private mental states, allowing for a kind of “private objectivity.” Wittgenstein’s reply is that such standards would themselves depend on the public language and practices of a scientific community, and thus cannot ground a genuinely private language.

The Tautological Nature of the Private Language Argument

Some commentators suggest that Wittgenstein’s argument against private language is, in a sense, tautological: if language is by definition a system of communication, then a language that is in principle uncommunicable is not a language at all. However, this deflates rather than refutes the argument, since the question was whether there could be a language that is essentially private.

Wittgenstein’s Legacy and Influence

Impact on Philosophy of Mind

Wittgenstein’s private language argument has been a touchstone for debates in philosophy of mind, especially concerning the nature of consciousness, qualia, and the possibility of “private” mental content. Philosophers such as Daniel Dennett and Gilbert Ryle have built on Wittgenstein’s insights to develop “anti-privacy” accounts of the mental.

Relevance to Cognitive Science

In cognitive science, Wittgenstein’s argument challenges deeply held assumptions about the “language of thought” or mental representation being essentially private. For Wittgenstein, meaning and representation are not internal mental events, but external, public practices.

Contemporary Relevance

Wittgenstein’s argument remains central to discussions of meaning, rule-following, and the social dimension of language. It continues to challenge philosophers who hold that meaning is determined by private mental acts or “intrinsic intentionality.”

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of an essentially private language is a profound and carefully constructed critique of the idea that meaning can be anchored in purely private experience. At its heart is the claim that meaning, rule-following, and language are irreducibly social phenomena. Without shared criteria, correction, and public practice, the very notion of meaning collapses into incoherence. For Wittgenstein, a language that only one person could speak is not just unteachable or impractical—it is conceptually impossible, because language, at its root, is a public, social game.

Wittgenstein does not deny that we have private experiences, nor that language can sometimes be used in ways that are obscure or idiosyncratic. But he does deny that such uses could ever constitute a language in the proper sense. The rule-governed character of language, and the possibility of distinguishing between correct and incorrect use, depends on the public, shared practices that are the lifeblood of all genuine linguistic activity.

To return to the original question: Why does later Wittgenstein think that there cannot be a language that only one person can speak? The answer, in brief, is that such a “language” would lack the criteria of correctness, the possibility of rule-following, and the shared practices that constitute meaning. The only languages we have are the public ones that we learn, share, and correct together—not because of contingency, but because of the very conditions that make language possible.

Wittgenstein’s argument against private language is not only a technical argument in the philosophy of language but a profound challenge to much of modern philosophy of mind and cognitive science. By insisting that meaning is public and that language is irreducibly social, Wittgenstein closes the door on the possibility of a genuinely private language—not because such a language would be difficult to create, but because it would be no language at all. The argument remains a cornerstone of 20th and 21st century philosophy, continuing to shape debates about meaning, mind, and the nature of human communication.

CITATIONS AND REFERENCES YOU CAN USE

References and Influential Works Cited

• Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (esp. §§243–315).
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Private Language”.
• Wikipedia, “Private language argument”.
• Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Private language argument”.
• Academic commentary and journal articles.

Citation of Key Points

• Wittgenstein’s definition of private language as “a language in principle incomprehensible to more than one person”.
• The central role of public criteria and social practices for meaning and rule-following.
• The impossibility of private ostension and the collapse of the “name-theory” of meaning.
• The distinction between having private experiences and ascribing meaning to them in a private language.
• The essentially social character of language and the impossibility of a truly private language in the strong sense.